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ARE THERE PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES IN TAx
FRAUD CASES?: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR SCHOENFELD
LEANDRA LEDERMAN'
INTRODUCTION
Since the Senate hearings on alleged abuses by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS),' and the resulting IRS Reform Act, enacted in 1998,2 scholarly attention
to perceived inequities in the resolution of tax controversies has mushroomed
For example, Professor Eric Posner has argued that the fact the IRS reform was
widely supported despite the impediments it imposes to audits suggests that, in
the absence of trust in the IRS, the public may not voluntarily comply with
federal tax laws.4
Last year, the Indiana Law Review published an article entitled A Critique
of the Internal Revenue Service's Refusal to Disclose How It "Determined" a
Tax Deficiency, and of the Tax Court's Acquiescence with This View by
Professor Marcus Schoenfeld (the "article").5 The article argued that current law
unfairly advantages the IRS in civil tax cases, particularly tax fraud cases. It
reflects a particular concern that "the [IRS] combines with the Tax Court to keep
the taxpayer from obtaining information about how the Service made its
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. A.B., 1987,
Bryn Mawr College; J.D., 1990, New York University School of Law; LL.M., 1993, New York
University School of Law. I would like to thank Terry Chorvat, David Hyman, and Stephen Mazza
for valuable comments on prior drafts of this article; Mark Newton for helpful conversations about
the article; and George Mason University School of Law and its Law and Economics Center for
financial support.
1. During three days of hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, taxpayers and IRS
agents told "horror stories" about IRS treatment of taxpayers. See Win. Brian Henning, Reforming
the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
82 MARQ. L. RFv. 405, 405 (1999). The hearings were broadcast on television. See Ryan J.
Donmoyer, Three Days of Hearings Paint Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX NOTES 1655, 1655
(1997).
2. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and ReformAct of 1998, 105 Pub. L. 206; 112
Stat. 685 § 1203 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Heather B. Conoboy, A Wrong Step in the Right Direction: The National
Taxpayer Advocate and the 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act; 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1401 (2000); Henning, supra note 1, at 405; Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REv. 413
(1999); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781
(2000); Amy S. Wei, Can Mediation Be the Answer to Taxpayers' Woes?: An Examination of the
Internal Revenue Service's Mediation Program, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549 (2000).
4. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1812.
5. Marcus Schoenfeld,A Critique ofthe Internal Revenue Service 's Refusal to Disclose How
It "Determined" a Tax Deficiency, and of the Tax Court's Acquiescence with This View, 33 IND.
L. REv. 517 (2000).
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determination of the taxpayer's deficiency.' 6
Professor Schoenfeld's article provides a helpful overview of tax cases
involving civil fraud, and discusses a wide array of procedural issues that arise
in many of those cases. There is all too little scholarship on tax procedure,7 so
it is particularly rewarding to discover an additional contribution. Although I
agree with Professor Schoenfeld's concern that there should be appropriate
controls on the power of the IRS,8 I disagree both with his suggestions for change
and with some of the premises underlying those suggestions.
Professor Schoenfeld's argument, briefly stated, is that a combination of
factors conspire to hinder taxpayers' defense of civil tax cases, particularly cases
involving allegations of fraud.9 The factors he points to span a variety of aspects
of tax procedure. First, a "presumption of correctness"'" attaches to the statutory
notice of deficiency," the letter from the IRS that legally asserts an
underpayment in tax and is required for the United States Tax Court ("Tax
Court") to take jurisdiction over a resulting lawsuit.12 Second, notices of
deficiency do not always adequately explain the reasons for the asserted
deficiency. 3 Third, the Tax Court generally will not "look behind"' 4 a notice of
deficiency to see what underlies it.'5 Fourth, techniques allowed by the Tax
Court to reconstruct unreported illegal income may "yield harsh results,"' 6
particularly with respect to co-conspirators only marginally involved in a
criminal conspiracy. 7 Fifth, the IRS may assert "that all of its documents are
privileged,"'" and therefore not available in discovery. 9 Sixth, the Tax Court
position that IRS errors will be remedied at trial ignores the substantive
importance of the notice of deficiency." Finally, collateral estoppel generally
precludes a taxpayer criminally convicted from denying facts found in the
criminal trial but does not preclude a civil tax trial of a taxpayer who was
acquitted criminally.2 ' In making these points, the article also discusses related
issues such as the procedures for declaring notices of deficiency involving
6. Id. at 569.
7. Steve Johnson, A Residual Damages Right Against the IRS: A Cure Worse than the
Disease, 88 TAx NOTES 395, 395 (2000).
8. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 568.
9. Id. at 517.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 6212(a), 6213(a) (Supp. 1999).
13. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 517.
14. Id. at 524.
15. Id. at 524-25.
16. Id. at 518.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 549.
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unreported income "arbitrary and erroneous. 22
Tax controversy procedure, like civil litigation procedure generally, reflects
a balancing of interests of plaintiff and defendant. In tax controversies, the
parties are the IRS and the taxpayer. In general, the procedural rules seek to
provide a level playing field, place the burden of producing information on the
party in possession of that information, and encourage settlement. Professor
Schoenfeld's criticism of the IRS and the Tax Court should be considered in that
context. That is, to what extent are the burdens he discusses unfairly targeted at
taxpayers, and to what extent do they reflect only one side of an even-handed
balancing act?
Professor Schoenfeld's concerns, listed above, logically fall into two general
categories: taxpayer access to IRS information and IRS techniques for proving
tax fraud. Accordingly, this reply has two principal parts. Part I disputes
Professor Schoenfeld's contentions that the IRS's approach, coupled with the
Tax Court's rules, hampers taxpayers' abilities to obtain appropriate information
to defend tax deficiency and tax fraud suits. Section A briefly outlines basic tax
controversy procedure. Section B focuses on notices of deficiency. It discusses
their importance and the multiple roles they play in tax controversies, and it
specifically considers the "presumption of correctness" as well as uninformative,
inaccurate, and arbitrary notices. Section C of Part I explores procedures for
obtaining the report of the IRS revenue agent.
Part II of this reply analyzes the IRS's methods of proving tax fraud, focusing
on the areas Professor Schoenfeld finds particularly objectionable: collateral
estoppel, the use of badges of fraud, and IRS-protective positions. Section A of
this Part analyzes the use of collateral estoppel and badges of fraud in the context
of the IRS's burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. This
section argues that these methods are appropriate means for the IRS to use to try
to meet that burden. Section B of Part II focuses on IRS-protective positions,
which address a materially different aspect of any fraud case: the amount of the
deficiency. Once fraud is proven by the IRS, it is the taxpayer who bears the
burden of proving the amount of the deficiency that is not attributable to fraud.
Section B focuses on the problems that this procedural posture causes while
refuting some of Professor Schoenfeld's objections to IRS-protective positions.
I. OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM THE IRS IN CIVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES
A. Basic Tax Controversy Procedure
As Professor Schoenfeld explains, civil tax cases generally begin with a
disagreement between the taxpayer and the IRS over the tax owed by the
taxpayer. 23 If the disagreement began with a refund claim filed by the taxpayer,
the IRS manifests its disagreement with a "notice of disallowance." In other
cases, an unresolved dispute generally results in IRS issuance of a "notice of
22. See id. at 539-40.
23. Id. at 520.
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deficiency," the letter mentioned previously that alerts the taxpayer to the amount
of the alleged deficiency (underpayment of tax). The notice may also contain
additions to tax for such things as late filing of the return, negligence, or fraud.
It generally also provides an explanation of the deficiency and additions to tax.
Except where collection of the tax is in jeopardy,4 the IRS generally is
required by statute to mail the taxpayer a notice of deficiency prior to
assessment.25 "Assessment" is formal recording-by the IRS of the taxpayer's tax
liability."6 Assessment is a legal prerequisite to the IRS's administrative
collection procedures. The notice of deficiency therefore is central to tax
controversies.
The notice of deficiency also provides the taxpayer with a "ticket to the Tax
Court"; Tax Court subject-matter jurisdiction over tax deficiency cases requires
both a notice of deficiency and a timely responsive petition (generally one that
is filed within ninety days of the date the notice of deficiency was mailed).27 The
IRS is required to file an answer.28 Those documents form the pleadings in Tax
Court litigation; additional pleadings may be made in the form of amendments
and a reply when required.29 In civil fraud cases, the IRS bears the burden of
persuasion by "clear and convincing evidence."30
B. The Notice of Deficiency
Exchange of information between the IRS and the taxpayer typically begins
with the audit. In most tax controversies, after the audit, the IRS will send the
taxpayer a preliminary notice of deficiency, commonly known as a thirty-day
letter. The thirty-day letter is the cover letter accompanying the IRS revenue
agent's report. It provides an opportunity for the taxpayer to obtain an
administrative appeal by responding within thirty days.3  Informal
communications, the revenue agent's report, the appeals conference, and other
settlement efforts are all sources of information about the IRS's case.
If a tax controversy remains unresolved when the statute of limitations nears
24. I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1994).
25. Id. § 6212(a) (Supp. V 1999) ("If the Secretary [of the Treasury] determines that there
is a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by [certain subtitles and chapters of the Code] he is
authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by certified mail or registered mail.").
The authorization language apparently refers to the method of delivery; the notice itself is not
optional. See id. § 6213(a) (subject to certain exceptions, "no assessment of a deficiency in respect
of any tax imposed by [certain subtitles and chapters] and no levy or proceeding in court for its
collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer").
26. See LEANDRA LEDERMAN& STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROvERSIES: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 8 (2000).
27. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1994).
28. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 30; see also id. at 36.
29. See id at 30, 37, 41.
30. Id. at 142(b); see also I.R.C. § 7454(a) (1994).
3 1. See LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 26, at 9.
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expiration, the IRS will send the taxpayer a notice of deficiency. The notice of
deficiency is the first official, required notice to the taxpayer of the IRS's
assertion of a tax underpayment. As discussed above, the taxpayer may be well-
versed in the IRS's case at the point he receives a notice of deficiency.
Nonetheless, the notice of deficiency provides official notice of the deficiency
amount and the IRS's reason for the adjustment.
Mailing of a notice of deficiency has multiple, important consequences.
First, the notice of deficiency provides notice to the taxpayer of the asserted
deficiency and of the IRS's intent to assess if the taxpayer does not respond by
filing a timely Tax Court petition (a notification function). Second, the notice
provides the taxpayer with the jurisdictional "ticket to the Tax Court," as
discussed above. Third, assessment of tax is prohibited during the ninety-day
period within which the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court, and if a Tax Court
petition is filed, until the Tax Court decision is final. Fourth, as a corollary, the
notice tolls the statute of limitations on assessment for the length of the
prohibited period plus sixty days, providing the IRS with time to assess tax
should the taxpayer lose the Tax Court case or fail to petition the Tax Court.
Fifth, if the taxpayer does petition the Tax Court, the notice of deficiency
becomes part of the pleadings, in effect forming the first statement of the IRS's
case, analogous to a complaint. Finally, in Tax Court, the notice of deficiency
plays an important role in allocating the burden of proof.32
A notice of deficiency that is defective such that it is invalid is void ab initio
so that, generally speaking, it plays none of these functions.3 The immediate
effect of a Tax Court determination that a notice is invalid is that the Tax Court
will dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A key collateral
consequence is that an invalid notice does not toll the statute of limitations on
assessment, so the period for assessment ordinarily will have expired.34
Expiration of the statute of limitations precludes assessment and collection of tax
by the IRS.
Professor Schoenfeld accurately points out that, in considering arguably
defective notices of deficiency, the Tax Court has overemphasized the
jurisdictional function of the notice of deficiency.35 I have previously argued that
not all defects in notices of deficiency are grounds for invalidation and
32. The notice of deficiency therefore has three main functions and several lesser functions.
The three main functions are the notice function, the pleading function in a Tax Court case, and the
jurisdictional function in Tax Court. Confusing these functions may result in inappropriate
remedies for defective notices, particularly inappropriate dismissals for lack of Tax Court subject-
matter jurisdiction. See generally Leandra Lederman, '"Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying
General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 183 (1996).
33. Cf Roszkos v. Comm'r, 850 F.2d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that notices of
deficiency sent to incorrect addresses were "null and void").
34. See, e.g., Reddock v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 21,26 (1979); Atlas Oil & Ref. Corp. v. Comm'r,
22 T.C. 552, 558-59 (1954), overruled on other grounds by Woods v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 776, 778
(1989).
35. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 534.
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concomitant dismissal of the Tax Court case.36 Instead, the Tax Court should
consider whether a defect affects the notification or pleading function or is truly
jurisdictional.37 In fact, a notice of deficiency needs far fewer elements to allow
the Tax Court to take jurisdiction over the case than it does to notify a taxpayer
in enough detail to enable the taxpayer to rebut IRS allegations in his principal
Tax Court pleading, the petition.38
1. The "Presumption of Correctness. "-As Professor Schoenfeld points out,
a "presumption of correctness" is afforded the notice of deficiency.39 This term
is somewhat misleading. Professor Schoenfeld argues that "the Notice [of
deficiency]... carries substantive weight because it is presumed to be correct."4
However, the presumption of correctness is not a true presumption; it carries no
more evidentiary weight than does the "presumption of innocence" of a criminal
defendant. The presumption of correctness merely serves to assign the burden
of going forward.4 That is, by affording the notice of deficiency initial credence,
the taxpayer must come forward in any Tax Court case with evidence to counter
it, rather than the IRS first submitting additional documents.4
There are two main rationales for the presumption of correctness. First, it is
the taxpayer who has the evidence supporting the entries on his tax return.43
Second, in the usual case, the IRS follows a businesslike routine that will be
effective in the vast majority of cases. In fact, many audits end at the
administrative level before a notice of deficiency is ever prepared. If the IRS has
concluded its administrative process through issuance of the notice, the
presumption of administrative regularity justifies placing the initial burden in
litigation on the taxpayer.44
There are two important exceptions to the usual case in which the notice of
deficiency provides a basis for placing the burden of going forward on the
taxpayer, one of which, "arbitrary and erroneous" notices, was discussed by
36. See Lederman, supra note 32, at 238.
37. See id.
38. Learned Hand famously stated that "the notice is only to advise the person who is to pay
the deficiency that the Commissioner means to assess him; anything that does this unequivocally
is good enough." Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937).
39. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 517.
40. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,441 (1976); Portillo v. Comm'r, 932 F.2d
1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1991); Anastasato v. Comm'r, 794 F.2d 884, 886 (3d Cir. 1986); cf DiMauro
v. United States, 706 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1983) (in wagering excise tax case, government must
come forward with evidence connecting taxpayer to wagering before presumption applies).
42. See Anastasato, 794 F.2d at 887. "The presumption of correctness establishes a prima
facie case, but it arises only if supported by foundational evidence connecting the taxpayer with the
tax-generating activity." Id. (emphasis added).
43. Sean M. Moran, The Presumption of Correctness: Should the Commissioner Be Required
to Carry the Initial Burden ofProduction, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1087, 1100 (1987).
44. See Lederman, supra note 32, at 201 n.97.
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Professor Schoenfeld. In Janis v. United States, 45 the United States Supreme
Court termed an arbitrary assessment a "'naked' assessment without any
foundation whatsoever. 4 6 The line of cases addressing arbitrary and erroneous
notices reflects the understanding that, in cases involving unreported income, the
rationale that the taxpayer possesses the evidence breaks down. As many courts
have noted, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove a negative (that is,
nonreceipt of income). Thus, in unreported income cases, particularly those
involving income allegedly received from illegal or illicit sources,47 if a taxpayer
alleges that the notice was arbitrary and erroneous, the burden of going forward
shifts back to the IRS to support the notice.4
In Ryan v. Commissioner,9 a case that influenced Professor Schoenfeld's
article,50 the Tax Court stated it this way:
As we review each of [the IRS's] assertions concerning each respective
search [by the police officer petitioners], we consider whether
respondent has presented predicate evidence linking the specific
petitioner to the tax-generating activity from which respondent asserts
income has arisen for such petitioner. Where there is no such predicate
evidence, we attribute no income to that petitioner."
When the IRS is able to tie the taxpayer to the illegal or illicit income-generating
activity, the IRS has met its burden, and the burden then shifts back to the
taxpayer. Faced with the allegation of a source of the income, the taxpayer is
then empowered to provide some defense to the allegation.
In several cases, taxpayers have been successful in shifting the burden to the
IRS based on an allegation that the notice of deficiency was arbitrary and
erroneous. Some of those cases were won on motion by the taxpayer because the
IRS could not come up with evidence supporting the notice.5" Admittedly, those
cases suggest administrative failure that burdened the taxpayer. However,
prevailing taxpayers are entitled to sue for administrative costs and litigation
45. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
46. Id. at 441.
47. "Most of the cases stating that the Commissioner is not entitled to the presumption [of
correctness] based on anaked assessment without factual foundation have involved illegal income."
Anastasato, 794 F.2d at 887. Anastasato involved the receipt of illicit "override" commissions by
a travel agent. See id. at 885. It is particularly hard to disprove the receipt of income that a
recipient would generally have received secretly.
48. Cf Gerardo v. Comm'r, 552 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that in case of
unreported illegal income, the IRS must present "some predicate evidence connecting the taxpayer
to the charged activity.").
49. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1778 (1998).
50. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 517 n.*. ("The opinions of the author are largely based
[sic] and are augmented by... Ryan.").
51. Ryan, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1777-78.
52. See, e.g., Portillo v. Comm'r, 932 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1991).
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fees.53 Those costs and fees may be awarded if the IRS pursued a frivolous
position, the taxpayer exhausted any administrative remedies afforded by the
IRS, and the taxpayer meets a net worth requirement.5 4
An exception to the usual burden of proof procedure was statutorily created
in 1998. Code section 7491 provides the taxpayer with the opportunity to shift
the burden of proof to the IRS, if he meets several requirements. Because, in
order to do so, the taxpayer is required to make an initial presentation of
"credible evidence" with respect to the factual issue," it is most accurate to say
that section 7491 places the burden of going forward on the taxpayer, though it
allows a shift in the burden of persuasion. As noted by numerous
commentators, 6 section 7491 is likely to be of little practical use. In addition,
the IRS already bears the burden of proving fraud. However, it is important to
note that the content of section 7491, with its "credible evidence" requirement,57
suggests continuing cognizance of the practical reality that the taxpayer is the one
with evidence supporting the entries on the tax return, just as the presumption of
correctness does.
Thus, the so-called presumption of correctness, though unfortunately
implying a degree of deference to the IRS, in fact serves the salutary purpose of
allocating the burden of going forward to the party in possession of the evidence
relating to the controversy. Even the workings of section 7491 reflect this
notion. Where the presumption would allocate the burden of going forward to
a party without evidence, because it alleges receipt of illicit income, case law
53. See I.R.C. § 7430 (1994).
54. See id.
55. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
56. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 413 (Code section 7491 "is a pernicious exercise in
symbolic legislation."); Anthony F. Newton, The 'Stat'Notice in the New Millennium: Shouldn't
the Notice Be User Friendly?, 91 TAx NoTES 1139, 1157 (2001) ("Congress did make a feeble
attempt to level the playing field with the addition of section 7491. However, its effect has not yet
been realized and, due to its limitations, more likely than not, it never will be."); see also Higbee
v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 438 (2001).
Because [the taxpayers] have failed to provide credible evidence of a casualty loss, the
burden of proof as to this issue is not placed on [the IRS]. Further, for similar reasons
regarding our discussion of [the taxpayers'] evidence for purposes of section 7491, we
conclude that [the taxpayers] have not met their burden of proof.
Id. at 443; cf Nathan E. Clukey, Examining the Limited Benefits of Shifting the Burden of Proof
to the IRS, 82 TAx NOTES 683 (1999).
This article ... posits that ... an expansive reading of credible evidence must be
rejected, and that once that is done, the statute will have a noticeable effect in regard to
evidence not governed by heightened substantiation requirements-by giving the
taxpayer a strategic advantage compared to prior law. However, it acknowledges that
where the heightened substantiation requirements are applicable, this strategic
advantage will be eviscerated.
Id. at 685.
57. Id. at 688.
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provides a mechanism for shifting that burden to the IRS.
2. Inaccurate, Arbitrary, and Uninformative Notices of Deficiency.-One
of Professor Schoenfeld's major complaints is the rule of Greenberg's Express,
Inc. v. Commissioner."3 In Greenberg's Express, the Tax Court held that it
would not "look behind a deficiency notice to examine the evidence used or the
propriety of [the IRS's] motives or of the administrative policy or procedure
involved in making [the] determinations." 9 The court reasoned that the Tax
Court trial is a de novo proceeding in which the administrative record is
irrelevant." In effect, the court seemed to be stating that it would not invalidate
the notice because of the process that generated it, even if that process might be
defective. Professor Schoenfeld makes the excellent point that the facts of
Greenberg's Express involved the issue of whether the IRS had chosen to audit
certain taxpayers for an impermissible reason, not if the audit process itself was
careless or otherwise defective. He argues that "Greenberg's Express is of little
pertinence to an inquiry into how (not why) a revenue agent may have committed
errors in preparing his determination of the assertions set out in the Statutory
Notice.""'
Although this analysis might imply that the holding of Greenberg's Express
should be limited to cases involving IRS selection of which returns to audit, there
is still value in treating the notice of deficiency as a pleading that the Tax Court
does not look behind. Essentially, the notice makes allegations of fact that the
taxpayer has the option to dispute in court.62 If there are mistakes in the notice
of deficiency, the taxpayer should have the evidence necessary to correct them
unless they arrive out of an arbitrary and erroneous notice, which the taxpayer is
empowered to counter procedurally, as discussed above. Analyzing the process
used to generate the notice would distract from analysis of the substantive issues
in the case.
Professor Schoenfeld posits that "[a]pplying Greenberg's Express as the
Service argues would shield almost all information that might tend to show that
an employee of the Service acted improperly or carelessly." 3 However, the
Greenberg's Express court did state that it would shift the burden of going
58. 62 T.C. 324 (1974).
59. Id. at 327.
60. Id. at 328.
61. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 528 (emphasis in original).
62. If the taxpayer never receives the notice or fails to petition the Tax Court in a timely
manner, he will still have an opportunity to litigate, post-assessment. Two fora will be available
to the taxpayer: the United States District Courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1) (1994). Following assessment, the taxpayer will be
required to pay the tax. Following payment, a taxpayer who wishes to contest the tax liability must
file a refund claim as a prerequisite to suit. I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994). Upon disallowance of the
claim, waiver of disallowance by the taxpayer, or passage of six months, the taxpayer may file suit
in either of the refund fora listed above. See id. § 6532(a)(1). Unfortunately, the "full payment"
rule does provide a barrier to accessing those fora. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
63. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 529.
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forward to the IRS if a taxpayer presented substantial evidence of
unconstitutional conduct by the IRS." Professor Schoenfeld makes this point
quite clearly: "[T]he Tax Court did not say that it would never look behind the
Statutory Notice. On the contrary, the court said it would do so, particularly
when there was substantial evidence of unconstitutional behavior on the part of
the Service's employees in preparing the Statutory Notice."65 He points out that,
in that instance, "the Statutory Notice would no longer carry the presumption of
correctness that is normally conferred upon it."" In other words, the Tax Court
would shift the burden of going forward to the IRS.
a. Inaccurate notices.-Professor Schoenfeld used Scar v. Commissioner67 as
"[a]n extreme example of the Tax Court's persistent refusal to look behind a
Statutory Notice."68  Scar is extreme; its facts are highly unusual and
unrepresentative of the overwhelming majority of statutory notices. However,
Scar has little relevance to Tax Court reluctance to examine the pre-notice of
deficiency administrative process at the IRS. Instead, Scar is a case about the
proper remedy for an inaccurate notice of deficiency.
As Professor Schoenfeld relates in his article, the notice of deficiency in Scar
asserted a deficiency of $96,600 based on the disallowance of deductions
attributable to the "Nevada Mining Project, '69 a tax shelter in which the Scars
had never invested. The notice calculated the deficiency by applying the
maximum marginal rate of seventy percent to $138,000 of disallowed deductions.
An attachment explained, "In order to protect the government's interest and since
your original income tax return is unavailable at this time, the income tax is being
assessed at the maximum tax rate of 70%. "70
The Scars' Tax Court petition denied that they had ever had any interest in
the Nevada Mining Project. The IRS's answer denied the allegations of the
petition in full. The Scars moved to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. In response,
the IRS conceded that the Scars had never had any interest in Nevada Mining,
and moved for leave to amend its answer, to state a decreased deficiency
attributable to Executive Productions, Inc., a videotape tax shelter."
In court, the IRS explained that the error in the notice had occurred because
one of its agents had transposed numbers when entering the code assigned to the
videotape tax shelter.72 The Scar case reflects a degree of sloppiness rarely seen.
As is evident from the case, the tax shelter era of the 1980s produced a
64. 62 T.C. at 328.
65. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 527-28 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 528.
67. 81 T.C. 855 (1983), rev'd, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 531.
69. Scar v. Comm'r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1987), rev g 81 T.C. 855 (1983).
70. Id. This aspect of the case is discussed below. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
71. 814 F.2d at 1365-66.
72. Id. at 1365.
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voluminous caseload for the IRS."
The main issue decided in Scar, which went up to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, was whether the faulty notice of deficiency was "invalid" and
therefore required dismissal for lack of Tax Court subject-matter jurisdiction.74
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's ruling that the notice was valid,
holding that the notice had failed to make the "determination" required by section
6212(a)." Professor Schoenfeld praises the outcome in Scar, stating:
The view of the Ninth Circuit in Scar seems correct. There really
should be a "determination" as prescribed in the statute and the Service's
published internal procedures, and then those determinations of fact and
law should be spelled out in the Notice. This is necessary to permit
fairness in litigation. The Statutory Notice not only confers jurisdiction
on the Tax Court, in practical effect it is really also the initial pleading
in the case.76
Although Professor Schoenfeld is correct that the notice of deficiency serves
a pleading function once a taxpayer invokes the Tax Court'sjurisdiction by filing
a petition, and although notices of deficiency should specify their determinations,
as the Code requires," that does not mean Scar was correctly decided. In fact,
what Scar did was turn a defect in a pleading function (framing the litigation)
into ajurisdictional objection. As discussed previously, much less is required
to get a case before a court than to make one's case to the court. In Scar, the
notice of deficiency met minimum jurisdictional standards: it contained the
Scars' names and address, the correct tax year, a deficiency amount, and a
statement explaining how the deficiency was calculated.7"
73. That volume is evidenced in part by the inventory of the Tax Court. IRS data reflects that
in 198 1, the Tax Court had about 38,000 docketed cases, with about seventeen percent of those tax
shelter cases, while in 1984, the Tax Court had about 43,000 docketed cases, thirty-three percent
of which were tax shelter cases. See U.S. TAX COURT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CHIEF COUNSEL FOR
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, OCTOBER 1986, at 1. According to the Tax Court, in fiscal year
1984, 42,024 cases were filed and 63,598 were pending. See UNITED STATES TAX COURT, 1990
FISCAL YEAR STATISTICAL INFORMATION (1991). By contrast, in fiscal year 2000, only 16,572
cases were pending in the Tax Court, and fewer than eleven percent of those were tax shelter cases.
See OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TAX
SECTION COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE 11 (2001). Scar was decided in 1983, during a spurt in
tax shelter litigation.
74. 814 F.2d at 1365.
75. See id. at 1370.
76. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 534.
77. See I.R.C. § 7522 (1994). Section 7522 is discussed in more detail later. See infra text
accompanying notes 100-1I1.
78. Cf Scar, 814 F.2d at 1370 n.1 I ("In the case before us the Commissioner argues that,
because the notice contained the Taxpayers' names, social security number, the tax year in question,
and 'the' amount of deficiency, it was 'clearly sufficient."'); Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651
(2d Cir. 1937) (holding that anything that communicates IRS's intent to assess suffices); Donohue
2001]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
The Scar notice nevertheless is highly problematic. Judge Hall, the former
Tax Court judge who dissented in Scar, stated that a notice of deficiency is
"nothing more than 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer's suit seeking the
Tax Court's redetermination of [the IRS's] determination of the tax liability."' 79
That is an overstatement; it does not account for the pleading function of the
notice. As I have previously argued, "The egregious content errors in the Scars'
statutory notice are troublesome but are notjurisdictional. The content errors in
the Scar notice should instead have been corrected during the litigation."' Once
the Scar answer was amended, it would have asserted "new matter" not raised in
the notice of deficiency, which would place the burden of proof on those issues
on the IRS." In fact, even if the IRS had not moved to amend its answer, the
Scars could have moved to have the burden shifted to the IRS under Tax Court
Rule 142(a) on the issues relating to the videotape tax shelter.
Thus, Scar involved an erroneous notice of deficiency. The Ninth Circuit's
decision to invalidate the notice did not require "looking behind" it to evidence
regarding the IRS's administrative process. Instead. the court found that
information on the face of the notice warranted the court's concern.
Unfortunately, the court chose the wrong remedy: it simply should have shifted
the burden of going forward to the IRS, rather than invalidating the notice and
therefore dismissing the case.
b. Arbitrary notices.-One issue in Scar was the apparent arbitrariness of
the IRS's "determination," because the Scars' original return was unavailable.
At first blush, it may appear impossible for the IRS to make a determination of
tax liability without the taxpayer's return. However, the IRS codes data from
each tax return. 2 The IRS's position, supported by case law, 3 is that the IRS
v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 954,954-56(1978) (holding that mutilated notice containing no date,
address, year or deficiency amount was sufficient for Tax Court subject-matter jurisdiction).
79. 814 F.2d at 1372 (Hail, J., dissenting) (quoting Stamm Int'l Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.
248, 252 (1985)). Subsequent decisions, even in the Ninth Circuit, have limited Scar to its facts.
See, e.g., Clapp v. Comm'r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Only where the notice of
deficiency reveals on its face that the Commissioner failed to make a determination is the
Commissioner required to prove that he did in fact make a determination."); Campbell v. Comm'r,
90 T.C. 110 (1988).
Where the alleged notice of deficiency reveals on its face that [the IRS] failed to make
a determination, then the Ninth Circuit would require respondent to prove that he did
make a determination. Here the 9-page document does not reveal on its face that [the
IRS] failed to make a determination.
Id. at 114.
80. Lederman, supra note 32, at 238.
81. See TAx CT. R. PRAc. & P. 142(a).
82. See Scar, 814 F.2d at 1374 n.4, stating:
Although the "unavailability" of the Scars' return may indicate that the Scars' original
paper return was not before the Commissioner, it does not show that specific data on that
return or relation to the video-tape tax shelter was not considered. Due to the
computerization of the IRS, the Commissioner no longer operates from original paper
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"may rely on taxpayer return information duly recorded in the Service's official
records and data bases""M because a requirement that the IRS rely only on the
original paper return would inhibit the IRS's efforts to computerize."
Computerization generally makes the IRS's processes both quicker and less
costly."
Another concern expressed in Scar is the hypothetical of an IRS run amok,
sending out notices of deficiency willy-nilly. The Ninth Circuit reproduced from
Judge Sterrett's dissent in the Tax Court an invented, tongue-in-cheek notice that
reflects this fear. In part, it states:
Dear Taxpayer: There is a rumor afoot that you were a participant in the
Amalgamated Hairpin Partnership during the year 1980. Due to the
press of work we have been unable to investigate the accuracy of the
rumor or to determine whether you filed a tax return for that year.87
It seems unlikely that the IRS would send out notices based on mere rumor
or worse, invidious discrimination against certain taxpayers. 8  In fact,
returns.
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting); Whittington v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 339 (1999) (IRS used Returns
Transaction Data System (RTVUE), a line-by-line transcript of taxpayer's return, in arriving at its
deficiency determination).
83. See, e.g., Griner v. Comm'r, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30021 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Griner's
argument that the determination was invalid because the Commissioner may not have used the
original papers filed by the Griners is without merit. Whether the Commissioner used the originals,
copies, or computer reports of the returns is not important."); Whittington v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M.
(CCH) 339 (1999) (upholding IRS use of RTVUE transcript of taxpayer's return to arrive at
deficiency determination).
84. IRS FSA 200004017, 1999 FSA LEXIS 291, *9.
85. Id. However, in a Tax Court case, appealable to the Ninth Circuit, in which the IRS did
not actually use the transcript of the return that was in its files, and simply computed the tax at the
top marginal rate, the IRS found the notice of deficiency invalid under the reasoning of Scar. See
Kong v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 696 (1990); see also Toll v. Comm'r, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
17529(9th Cir. 199 1) (similar holding by the Ninth Circuit, on similar facts); Carnahan v. Comm'r,
61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2406, 2407-08 (1991) (prior docket in the case was dismissed because it was
based on notice of deficiency that stated "[in order to protect the government's interest and since
your original income tax return is unavailable at this time, the income tax is being assessed at the
maximum tax rate of 70%.").
86. For example, in 1993, the IRS estimated that its use of the RTVUE system would save
$1.2 million dollars, and would enable the IRS to provide taxpayers with transcripts of their
accounts within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of a request, as opposed to the six to eight weeks
required to obtain a copy of a tax return. See Fact Sheet FS-93-3, 1993 IRB LEXIS 394.
87. Scar, 814 F.2d 1363, 1370 n.12 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Scar v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 855,
869 (1983) (Sterrett, J., dissenting)).
88. In a Litigation Guideline Memorandum issued by the IRS to its personnel shortly after
Scar was decided, and released in 2000 under the Freedom of Information Act, the IRS stated, in
part:
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investigation of the "abuses" alleged at the IRS hearings-most of which were
concentrated in the collections areag--suggests that many of them were
unfounded." In addition, the Code provides criminal penalties for unauthorized
inspection of return information by IRS employees.9' Furthermore, the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 included a provision
known as the "Ten Deadly Sins," commission of which requires termination of
the IRS employee.92 The "sins" include "violations of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, Department of Treasury regulations, or policies of the Internal Revenue
Service (including the Internal Revenue Manual) for the purpose of retaliating
against, or harassing, a taxpayer, [or] taxpayer representative,"93 as well as
"threatening to audit a taxpayer for the purpose of extracting personal gain or
benefit."94
Taxpayers also have tools to contest arbitrary or unfounded notices of
deficiency. First, the Tax Court provides a forum for taxpayers to contest notices
of deficiency without first paying the deficiency asserted. In addition, an
undocumented notice alleging unreported income would be arbitrary and
erroneous, which, on the taxpayer's motion, would result in a shift to the IRS of
the burden of going forward, unless the IRS were able to tie the taxpayer to the
tax-generating activity. In the case of an arbitrary notice denying a deduction,
credit, or exclusion, the taxpayer should have the evidence to rebut the IRS's
contention. Furthermore, as discussed above, Code section 7430 allows a court
to award a prevailing taxpayer reasonable litigation and administrative costs if
the IRS's position was not substantially justified and the taxpayer "has exhausted
the administrative remedies available"" to him within the IRS.96
Section 7430, which requires that the taxpayer substantially prevail, will not
protect a taxpayer who loses on the merits after a successful "fishing expedition"
Notwithstanding our legal view that the Ninth Circuit panel majority was incorrect in
its legal analysis of the jurisdiction of the Tax Court and our commitment to defend the
jurisdiction as noted above, the process the Service used in Scar is rightly condemned.
The Office of Chief Counsel has expressed to the Examination Division its strong
objections to the procedure of issuing inadequate notices to "protect the government's
interest." Steps are being taken to prevent a repeat of the situation exemplified by Scar.
All attorneys in the Office of Chief Counsel should be aware of this and take necessary
steps to forestall further Scar situations.
LGM TL-3 (Jan. 15, 1988), 2000 TNT 121-89.
89. See George Guttman, Public Relations: The IRS CouldDo a Lot More to Help Its Image,
87 TAX NoTEs 479, 480 (2000).
90. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Horror Story Heard by Senate Panel Was Half-Told Tale, 79 TAX
NoTEs 518, 520 (1998).
91. See I.R.C. § 7213A (Supp. V 1999).
92. H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 1203 (1998).
93. Id. at § 1203(b)(6)-(10).
94. Id.
95. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (1994).
96. Id. § 7430.
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by the IRS. However, Tax Court rules require parties or their attorneys to sign
their pleadings,97 and they contain sanctions similar to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for pleadings filed for improper purposes:
The signature of counsel or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that... to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposedfor
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost oflitigation.... If a pleading is signed
in violation of this Rule, the Court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including reasonable
counsel's fees.98
This provision provides a sanction for the hypothetical circumstance in which
IRS pleadings were made in order to perpetuate a case premised on harassing the
taxpayer.
c. Uninformative notices.-Professor Schoenfeld also expresses concern
about specificity in notices of deficiency, arguing that
[a]pplying Greenberg's Express as the Service argues would shield
almost all information that might tend to show that an employee of the
Service acted improperly or carelessly. Except for the most blatant and
erroneous situations, such as an obvious and substantial mathematical
error on the face of the Statutory Notice, or a Notice which clearly does
not refer to the petitioner's income or deductions, a petitioner must know
how the specific dollar assertions in the Statutory Notice were computed
in order to begin to bear his burden of refuting the assertions.99
It is certainly true that the taxpayer must know how the dollar amounts in the
notice were determined in order to produce appropriate evidence to contradict the
determination. However, Greenberg's Express does not prevent specificity in
notices of deficiency. On the contrary, Code section 7522, enacted subsequent
to the decision in Greenberg's Express, requires specificity in IRS notices,
including notices of deficiency. In part, it provides: "Any notice to which this
section applies shall describe the basis for, and identify the amounts (if any) of,
97. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 23(a)(3) ("The original signature, either of the party or the
party's counsel, shall be subscribed in writing to the original of every paper filed by or for that party
with the Court, except as otherwise provided by these Rules."); id. at 33(b) ("if a pleading is not
signed, it shall be stricken, unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader.").
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 529 (footnote omitted).
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the tax due, interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable
penalties included in such notice."'"
Enforcement of section 7522 should address Professor Schoenfeld's concerns
about unspecific and uninformative notices. Unfortunately, Tax Court
jurisprudence interpreting this provision has not been ideal. Section 7522 also
provides that "[a]n inadequate description... shall not invalidate [the] notice.'' °
That has the positive effect of avoiding a taxpayer win based on a jurisdictional
ruling when the nature of the error actually affects the pleading function of the
notice. However, the quoted sentence has the unfortunate effect of precluding
one remedy without specifying another.
Over time, the Tax Court has developed the remedy of shifting the burden of
proof to the IRS as a remedy for violation of section 7522."°2 This remedy in
effect requires the IRS to come up with the explanation it did not afford in the
notice of deficiency. It relieves the taxpayer from having to counter an unknown
allegation. It is an excellent remedy for a vague notice. Unfortunately, in Shea
v. Commissioner, 3 the Tax Court applied the same standard as it does to
determine if the IRS has raised "new matter," which requires shifting the burden
of proof to the IRS."° The "new matter" jurisprudence encourages the IRS to
draft broadly worded notices of deficiency so that little raised subsequently will
be found inconsistent with the determination in the notice of deficiency.'0° That
test for new matter is not appropriate for determining whether the notice is
adequately specific and descriptive."°
100. I.R.C. § 7522(a) (1994). The section applies to notices of deficiency. See id. § 7522(b).
101. Id. § 7522(a).
102. See Sheav. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 183 (1999).
We, therefore, hold that where a notice of deficiency fails to describe the basis on which
the Commissioner relies to support a deficiency determination and that basis requires
the presentation of evidence that is different than that which would be necessary to
resolve the determinations that were described in the notice of deficiency, the
Commissioner will bear the burden of proof regarding the new basis. To hold otherwise
would ignore the mandate of section 7522 and Rule 142(a).
Id. at 197; Straight v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457 (1997) (IRS conceded that shifting the
burden of proof would be appropriate remedy for section 7522 violation); Ludwig v. Comm'r, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 961, 963 (1994) ("What then remains of the responsibility of the IRS when the
Commissioner fails to obey the command of section 7522(a)? Perhaps this Court could fashion
some sort of remedy for the taxpayer, such as imposing the burden of proof, or at least the burden
of going forward, on the Government.").
103. 112 T.C. 183 (1999).
104. See id. at 193-94; TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 142(a); see also Elliott v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M.
(CCH) 13, *21 (2001) ("In a recent case, we considered whether the Commissioner's position was
new matter in the context of section 7522." Citing Shea v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 183 (1999)).
105. See Leandra Lederman Gassenheimer, The Dilemma ofDeficient Deficiency Notices, 73
TAXES 83 (1995) (containing a detailed discussion).
106. See Leandra Lederman, Deficient Statutory Notices and the Burden ofProof: A Reply to
[Vol. 35:143
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR SCHOENFELD
For example, in Sellers v. Commissioner,"7 the notice of deficiency stated
that the IRS had disallowed the taxpayers' bad debt deduction "because it has not
been established that any amount of bad debts existed in fact and in law."'0 8
Similarly, the IRS stated that it disallowed a net operating loss carryover
"because it has been determined that a net operating loss did not exist in the year
that caused the carryforward."' The Tax Court stated, with respect to section
7522, "At trial, [the IRS] has taken no position that would require [the taxpayers]
to present evidence different from that necessary to resolve the determinations
that were described in the notice of deficiency, so as tojustify placing the burden
of proof on [the IRS]." ° In fact, the broader the statement in the notice of
deficiency, the less likely different evidence would be needed to prove post-
notice positions adopted by the IRS. Fortunately, the Tax Court does recognize
the purpose of section 7522."' Additional reform in this area would solve the
problem; Greenberg's Express need not be overruled.
C. Obtaining the Revenue Agent's Report
Professor Schoenfeld argues that, because of Greenberg's Express and
assertions of privilege, the IRS "consistently argues that all documents
supporting its computations of a deficiency are.., not discoverable.""' 2  He
focuses on the revenue agent's report."' Yet, many, if not most, taxpayers
receive the revenue agent's report before ever receiving a notice of deficiency;
it generally arrives with the thirty-day letter. In fact, in order to demonstrate the
function of the revenue agent's report, Professor Schoenfeld quotes Block-
Southland Sportswear Co. v. United States"4 as saying, "The purpose of such
letter and report is to inform the taxpayer of the results of an income tax audit for
a particular year and to extend to him an opportunity to request a conference for
a further discussion of a proposed adjustment in his tax liability.""' The prior
sentence of that opinion states, "On June 23, 1971, under Section 6532(a)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the District Director of Internal Revenue of
the State of North Carolina issued to plaintiff his Form L191 (Rev. 3-69)
commonly known as a 'thirty-day letter' to which was attached a Revenue
Mr. Newton, 92 TAX NOTES 117, 122-23 (2001) (criticizing Shea's approach to § 7522).
107. 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 135 (2000).
108. Id. at 138.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
111. See Elliott v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, *22 (2001) ("[The Shea] holding was
predicated on our understanding that the purpose of section 7522 is to give taxpayers notice of the
basis for a deficiency determination.").
112. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 536.
113. See id. at 536-37.
114. 73-1 USTC 9230, aff'd, 480 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1973).
115. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 537 n. 122 (quoting Block-Southland Sportswear Co., 73-1
USTC 9230).
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Agent's Report.""6
If the taxpayer does not receive a copy of the revenue agent's report with the
thirty-day letter, many practitioners request it (and in fact, often request the entire
administrative file) as soon as the notice of deficiency arrives."' If an informal
request is unsuccessful, a Freedom of Information Act request is in order. That
may or may not result in obtaining the file in time for use in Tax Court litigation.
If it does not, use of the Tax Court's discovery procedures is the remaining
option.
Professor Schoenfeld states that,
[i]n effect, the Service is asserting that everything its employees do at
any time is potentially part of some future litigation and, thus, not
discoverable. This position reinforces the Service's position in
Greenberg's Express, sharply decreasing the likelihood that a petitioner
will find a basis for any error in a Statutory Notice." 8
Yet, Peterson v. United States,"9 the case that Professor Schoenfeld discusses
immediately following the quoted language, contradicts the assertion that the
taxpayer will be hampered. In that case, although the government argued that
documents were privileged as prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the
court did not so find:
The only indication before the court that the documents were so
prepared are conclusory statements by counsel for the Government. The
Government has neither shown nor offered to show that such documents
are trial preparation material. Generally, it is this court's belief that IRS
appellate conferee reports and IRS field agent reports are not prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial. Presumably they are prepared
in the assessment and review process and, if they be held to be in
anticipation of litigation, it is hard to see what would not be. Litigation
cannot be anticipated in every such case when relatively few result in
litigation. Since no showing to the contrary has been made or offered,
it is this court's finding that the contents of the documents sought to be
discovered by the plaintiffs through Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 8 are not
trial preparation material and are not protected from discovery by rule
26(b)(3).' 20
Peterson was not the only case in which the taxpayer was able to obtain
116. Block-Southland Sportswear Co., 73-1 USTC 9230.
117. Cf Swanson v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 76, 81 (1996) ("Because the notice of deficiency failed
to adequately explain respondent's bases for determining deficiencies and additions to tax with
respect to the years at issue, petitioners requested and received the revenue agent's report in their
case.").
118. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 537 (emphasis in original).
119. 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
120. Id. at 320-21 (emphasis added).
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revenue agent reports. In Hernley v. United States,2 ' a case in which the
taxpayer sought disclosure of grand jury materials, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit stated: "In support of their claim of right to depose Agent
Johnson, the Hernly defendants asserted that in discovery they had obtained a
copy of Agent Johnson's Revenue Agent's Report."' The court also described
contents of that report, including contents relating to civil fraud.'23
Professor Schoenfeld's concern may be that Peterson and other favorable
cases were not decided by the Tax Court. He states:
[T]he [Internal Revenue] Service... often refuses to disclose exactly
how it calculated the dollar amounts of the taxpayer's asserted tax
deficiencies, based upon its overly broad interpretation of case law. This
refusal to disclose details seems to be contrary to the discovery rules of
the Tax Court; however, the court usually agrees with the Service's
position because it does not wish to look into the inner administrative
workings of the agency.
24
Tax Court discovery rules seem to allow taxpayers to obtain revenue agents'
reports. Tax Court Rule 70(b)(1) states in part, "The information or response
sought through discovery may concern any matter not privileged and which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending case."'25  In Haag v.
Commissioner,26 the Tax Court admitted a thirty-day letter and revenue agent's
report into evidence "for the limited purpose of showing the basis for the
deficiency determination, and not as proof of the facts contained therein.""' The
Tax Court does not always admit revenue agents' reports into evidence, but
inadmissibility of evidence does not preclude its availability through discovery.
"It is not ground for objection [to discovery] that the information or response
sought will be inadmissible at the trial, if that information or response appears
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, regardless of
the burden of proof involved."'2
In Rountree Cotton Co. v. Commissioner,2 9 a case submitted to the court
fully stipulated, the Tax Court refused to admit into evidence a revenue agent's
report that the taxpayer had received "before issuance of the notice of
deficiency."'30 The court sustained the IRS's relevance objection, finding that
the IRS's pre-notice administrative record was irrelevant given the absence of
121. 832 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 982-83.
124. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 518.
125. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 70(b)(1).
126. 88 T.C. 604 (1987), affd, 855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988).
127. Id. at622n.14.
128. TAX CT. R. PRAc. & P. 70(b)(1).
129. 113 T.C. 422 (1999), affd, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 5258 (10th Cir. 2001).
130. Id. at 426.
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allegations of unconstitutional IRS conduct. 3 ' However, Professor Schoenfeld's
objection seems to be that the revenue agent's report may be unavailable to the
taxpayer, not that it will be inadmissible as evidence supporting the taxpayer. In
Rountree Cotton, as in most other cases, the taxpayer will already have obtained
the report. 32
II. PROOF IN TAX FRAUD CASES
Although Professor Schoenfeld's primary concern seems to be with obtaining
information from the IRS, he also expresses concern about the IRS's methods for
proving tax fraud, particularly the use of collateral estoppel, badges of fraud, and
allocation of the proceeds of a criminal conspiracy. Each of these is discussed
below.
Code section 6663(a) contains the fraud penalty. It provides: "If any part of
any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there
shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the
underpayment which is attributable to fraud."'3 Therefore, a civil fraud case
requires proof of both underpayment of tax and fraud. The IRS has the burden
of proving fraud, and it must do so by clear and convincing evidence. 34 In fact,
the IRS must establish each element of fraud with that level of proof. Collateral
estoppel and so-called "badges of fraud" are techniques the IRS uses to meet its
burden of proving the fraud element. The underpayment element generally
requires additional evidence.
An underpayment of tax in a fraud case generally stems either from
disallowed deductions or unreported income. Professor Schoenfeld's article
focuses on cases involving unreported income, particularly cases involving
illegal income. Because of the difficulties of proving the negative of nonreceipt,
an IRS determination of receipt ofprofits from an illegal enterprise requires some
predicate evidence connecting the taxpayer to the activity.'35 The importance of
this element of the proof is discussed below.
A. Methods of Proving Fraud
1. Collateral Estoppel.-Professor Schoenfeld states that "[c]ollateral
estoppel is... a no-win situation for the taxpayer: heads the Service wins, tails
the taxpayer loses."'36 He is referring to the reality that in addition to the fact
that a conviction of criminal tax evasion'37 estops the taxpayer from denying the
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
133. I.R.C. §6663(a)(1994).
134. See id. § 7454(a); TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 142(b).
135. Anastasato v. Comm'r, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Gerardo v. Comm'r, 552 F.2d
554, 556 (3d Cir. 1977).
136. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 549 n.189.
137. For purposes of applying collateral estoppel, a plea of guilty is treated the same as a
conviction. See, e.g., McCulley v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3163, 3165 n.5 (1997); see also
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elements of the crime, acquittal of a tax crime does not preclude a subsequent
civil trial because the burden of proof is lower in a civil fraud trial ("clear and
convincing evidence," as opposed to "beyond a reasonable doubt"). This is not
unique to tax cases; it is well known that when O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the
murders of Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman,' collateral estoppel did not.
preclude successful wrongful death suits by the families of the victims.'39 In fact,
it is logical that although conviction under a higher standard of proof precludes
contesting the predicate findings under a lower standard of proof, acquittal under
a higher standard of proof does not preclude a subsequent suit under a lower
standard of proof.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel allows a court to preclude relitigation of
an issue that was decided in a previous case that involved the party against whom
estoppel is sought. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine ofresjudicata,
has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation."' 0 The issue with respect to which
estoppel is sought must have been necessary in reaching the original decision, 4'
as well as part of a "valid and final judgment."'42 In addition, courts consider
whether the party sought to be estopped had a "full and fair opportunity to
litigate"'43 the issue in the first suit.'"
As previously indicated, burden of proof is also considered when a party
seeks estoppel. Acquittal of a criminal charge is "an adjudication that the proof
was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused."' 45 Accordingly, acquittal does not preclude a subsequent civil trial on
the same issues; 46 the standard of proof is lower in a civil proceeding.' In
Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716,722 n. 13(5th Cir. 1995). However, there are good arguments that
a plea should be analyzed differently. See Kathleen H. Musslewhite, The Application of Collateral
Estoppel in the Tax Fraud Context: Does It Meet the Requirement ofFairness and Equity?, 33 AM.
U. L. REv. 643 (1984).
138. See Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-blindness in the Rehnquist Court:
Comparing the Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by a Black Death Row Inmate and
White Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 815, 852 n. 193 (1996) (referring to State
of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, B.A. 097211 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 1, 1995)).
139. See Complaint for Damages for Wrongful Death Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC03640
(Cal..Super. Ct., L.A. County May 4, 1995), http://www.courttv.com/casefileslsimpson/documents/
goldcomp.html; Complaint forDamages-Survival Action Brown v. Simpson,No. SC036876 (Cal.
Super. Ct., L.A. County June 12, 1995), http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/simpson/documents/
browncomp.html.
140. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 326 n.5.
142. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
143. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979).
144. See, e.g., id.
145. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302 (1914) (emphasis added).
146. E.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) ("That acquittal on a criminal
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addition, criminal conviction precludes relitigation in a civil case of the elements
of the offense:
Because of the higher standard of proof and the numerous safeguards
surrounding a criminal trial, a conviction in a criminal action is
conclusive in a subsequent civil litigation between the same parties as to
issues that were actually litigated and adjudicated in the prior criminal
proceeding.148
The rationale behind applying collateral estoppel makes as much sense in tax
cases as it does in other cases. Tax fraud cases are no exception. Thus, as
Professor Schoenfeld notes, a taxpayer convicted of criminal tax fraud under
Code section 7201 will likely be estopped from denying tax fraud in a subsequent
civil suit.'49
Under section 7201, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the taxpayer "willfully attempt[ed] in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
.... 91 0 In Amos v. Commissioner,5' the Tax Court held that the willfulness
element of section 7201 encompasses all of the elements of the fraud provision
that is now Code section 6663."' Given the identity of issue combined with the
charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the
same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled.").
147. See Commander Roger D. Scott, Kimmel, Short, Mcvay: Case Studies in Executive
Authority, Law and the Individual Rights of Military Commanders, 156 MIL. L. REV. 52, 109 n.212
(1998) ("The same evidence that might not meet the higher standard of proof applicable in a
criminal context ('beyond a reasonable doubt') might satisfy the standard of proof for liability in
a civil context ('a preponderance of evidence')."). Civil fraud proceedings have an intermediate
standard of proof, "clear and convincing evidence." E.g., Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d
1285, 1286 n.l (9th Cir. 1982); Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 61 (9th Cir. 1958).
148. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(footnote omitted); see also Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951)
(stating that "[ilt is well established that a prior criminal conviction may work an estoppel in favor
of the Government in a subsequent civil proceeding.").
149. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 547.
150. I.R.C. § 7201 (1994). The section provides, in full:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law,
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
Id.
151. 43 T.C. 50 (1964), aff-d, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965), overruled in part on other
grounds by Meier v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 273 (1988).
152. Id. at 55; see also I.R.C. § 6663(a) (1994) ("If any part of any underpayment of tax
required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to
75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud."). Amos was applying
the fraud provision that used to be contained in Code section 6653(b). See Amos, 43 T.C. at 52.
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higher burden of proof required in the criminal case, estoppel can apply to
preclude the taxpayer to deny tax fraud if he was convicted of a willful attempt
to evade or defeat tax.1
53
In addition, there is an array of tax crimes that do not estop the taxpayer from
denying civil tax fraud. 54 Many of these other crimes are more easily proven by
the IRS because they do not require proof of a tax deficiency, and Code section
7201 does. 5  Thus, not every taxpayer convicted of a tax crime will face
collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil case.
2. Badges of Fraud.-Commission of fraud requires scienter. That is,
negligent or even grossly negligent activity does not constitute fraud because
fraud has an intent element. It is rarely possible for the IRS to prove to a court
the taxpayer's intent to violate the law through direct evidence (such as a
confession). Accordingly, the IRS uses circumstantial evidence known as
"badges of fraud" to try to meet its burden. Professor Schoenfeld lists ten of the
badges fraud frequently used in civil tax cases:
A. A Pattern of Understatement.
B. Concealment of Assets or Sources of Income.
C. Dealings in Cash.
D. Failure to Maintain Books and Records.
E. Engaging in Illegal Activities.
F. Attempting to Conceal Illegal Activities.
G. Failure to Cooperate with Tax Authorities.
H. Showing a Willingness to Defraud Business Associates or Others.
I. Taxpayer's Sophistication, Education, and Knowledge of-Duty to
Report Income.
J. Giving Implausible Explanations.'56
Most of the items on the above list-other than item I., which is not focused
on acts-comport with intuition about the likely behavior of an individual
engaged in tax fraud. With respect to the first item on his list, a pattern of
understatement, Professor Schoenfeld states:
In any year for which the taxpayer has been convicted of filing a
false return, under I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1999) [sic], the Service will treat
that year as part of a pattern of understatement, thereby helping prove
the intent to evade. However, this reasoning is circular and illogical. In
Wright, the Tax Court decided that a conviction for filing a false return
153. See, e.g., Blohm v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (1 ith Cir. 1993); Klein v. Comm'r,
880 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1989); Gray v. Comm'r, 708 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 927 (1984); Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Amos
v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 50, 56 (1964), affid, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
154. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7203, 7206, 7207 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
155. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343,351 (1965); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 361 (1958).
156. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 556.
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under I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1999) does not equal fraud, because the required
intent to evade tax is not an element of I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1999). It is
quite illogical to say that § 7206(1) requires an additional factor to show
fraud, and then attempt to prove that additional factor by invoking §
7206(1) itself.'
Certainly conviction of a section 7206(1) offense does not in and of itself
establish fraud. If it did, it could be used to estop the taxpayer from rebutting a
civil fraud claim for the same year.'58 That is, unlike Code section 7201, section
7206(1)' does not contain an element of intent to evade taxes,"W nor does it
require proof of an understatement of tax. The civil fraud penalty requires proof
of both. 6' Nonetheless, conviction of a section 7206(1) violation is highly
relevant. It demonstrates intent to file a false return, an illegal activity. If the
return in fact understated tax, that is an instance of understatement of tax. 62 If
there are other such instances, they may form a pattern. A pattern of
understatement is an indicium of fraudulent intent.163
In Investment Research Associates v. Commissioner,'6 a fairly recent tax
fraud case, the Tax Court compiled a longer list of indicia of fraud that included
the following:
1) failure to produce records during discovery;
2) destruction of records;
3) misleading statements or actions;
4) commingling of personal assets with those of the taxpayer's
corporation in an attempt to avoid tax;
5) diversion of income to third parties;
157. Id. at 557-58 (footnotes omitted).
158. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
159. Code section 7206 ljrovides, in relevant part:
Any person who-
(1)... Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document,
which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties
of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material
matter... shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more
than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7206 (1994).
160. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 359-60 & n.8 (1973).
161. See I.R.C. § 6663(a) (1994).
162. See, e.g., Considine v. United States, 645 F.2d 925, 928-31 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that
prior conviction under section 7206(1) estopped taxpayer from contesting that the return was
willfully false and resulted in an underpayment of tax, as indictment had charged that return was
false because items of income were omitted).
163. "The existence of several indicia is persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud." Inv.
Research Assocs. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 1081 (1999) (emphasis added).
164. Id.
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6) reporting income from property beneficially owned by the taxpayer
on the returns of family members;
7) structuring of a business and use of cash management techniques
which made difficult the tracing of income;
8) banking devices used to conceal earnings;
9) concealing income under the names of other persons who reported
such income;
10) omission of income from the taxpayer's property, title to which was
held in names of others who reported the income therefrom.'65
Of course, as Professor Schoenfeld states, a taxpayer could have reasons
other than tax evasion for engaging in any of these acts.' Thus, these items are
merely indicia of fraud, not proof of fraud. Professor Schoenfeld expresses
concern that "[t]he Service can assert, as an indicia [sic] of fraud, every badge
of fraud against a taxpayer that could possibly be true. Of course, the Service
will not assert any countervailing factors."'67 He is probably right. However, in
an adversary system, assertion of countervailing factors and evidence is the job
of the taxpayer and his counsel, not of the IRS. In addition, the question of fraud
is a factual one that courts resolve by considering the entire record.'"
B. Reconstruction of Income
Professor Schoenfeld understandably expresses great concern with respect
to proper allocation of gross income in a tax fraud case involving co-
conspirators.'69 There are inherent difficulties in reconstructing unreported
income, and those difficulties are compounded if proceeds from an enterprise
were divided among the participants. That is, conspiracy fraud cases may raise
more risk of an excessive deficiency determination with respect to a particular
taxpayer than do fraud cases involving a single individual. 7
The IRS makes the initial determination of the amount of gross income
165. Id. (citations omitted). Investment Research Associates cites the following cases: United
States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915 (6th Cir 1990); Scallen v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 1364, 1370-71
(8th Cir. 1989); Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958); Maddas v. Commissioner,
114 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1940); Lewis v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1983), affid, 762
F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985); McManus v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 999 (1972), aff'd, 486
F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973); Estate of Beck v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 297 (1971); Lang v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 666 (1961); Hecht v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 981 (1951).
166. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 567.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Gajewski v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir.
1978).
169. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 541.
170. See, e.g., Jones v. Comm'r, 903 F.2d 1301, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding
deficiency based on $33 million of unreported income from drug sales in a particular location,
where taxpayer denied involvement but did not explain who might be receiving the drug proceeds
instead).
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allocable to a taxpayer. Its determination is reflected in the notice of deficiency.
As discussed previously, even in civil cases not involving fraud, a determination
of unreported income must have some support if the taxpayer denies receipt of
income.'" A determination without foundation is "arbitrary and erroneous."'"
If the taxpayer alleges such a "naked assessment," the burden of going forward
shifts to the IRS. If the IRS cannot support its determination, generally by
linking the taxpayer to an illegal tax-generating activity, the IRS loses.' 73
In civil cases involving an allegation of unreported income, if the taxpayer
denies receiving the income, the IRS may use a variety of techniques to
"reconstruct" that income. Court-approved techniques include the net-worth
method, which "is particularly well-suited to ferreting out hidden income,
especially income from illegal sources;"'74 the cash transaction method; the bank
deposits method; the specific items method; the source and application of funds
method; and the T-account method.1' Each one seeks to establish the amount of
income earned by the taxpayer and to compare it to the taxpayer's return to
determine the amount of unreported income, if any.
In a case involving a fraud penalty, the IRS bears the burden of proving both
fraud and an underpayment of tax by clear and convincing evidence. Use of
these methods of reconstructing income assists the IRS in proving that there was
an underpayment of tax; absent an underpayment, the fraud penalty does not
apply. 76 However, once the IRS proves fraud, the burden shifts to the taxpayer
to establish the amount of the deficiency not attributable to fraud.177 A denial of
the underlying activities will not help the taxpayer at this stage, because the court
will not reach this stage unless it is convinced that the taxpayer committed
fraud. 178
171. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems
of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1421, 1426 (1991). In Hollandv. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954),
the United States Supreme Court approved the use of the "net worth" method but required proof
of a "likely source" of the unreported income. Id. at 132, 137-38.
175. See LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 26, at 80.
176. See I.R.C. § 6663(a) (1994).
177. See id. § 6663(b).
178. Cf Jones v. Comm'r, 903 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding IRS assertion of
$33 million of unreported income). The court stated:
Jones offered almost no real evidence to prove that the Commissioner's assessment was
erroneous except his weak attempts to distance himself from all drug sales. He made
no attempt to sugsest a more appropriate or more accurate estimate of his drug related
income, nor did he suggest who, if not he, was receiving the majority of income arising
from drug trafficking at Hanover Place in 1985.
Id. at 373. See also Mandina v. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 359 (1982), af'd, 758 F.2d 1399 (11 th
Cir. 1984 (per curiam), and affd as modified sub nom. Schaffer v. Comm'r, 779 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1985). In Mandina, the court stated:
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In conspiracy cases, the IRS faces another level of complication in
determining the taxpayer's deficiency, and the taxpayer faces a corresponding
complication in rebutting that determination. Once the IRS has reconstructed
income from the conspiracy, it must allocate the income among the participants.
Professor Schoenfeld refers to allocation of aggregate conspiracy profits as the
"slice of the pie" approach.'79 The IRS may alternatively use what Professor
Schoenfeld terms the "act-by-act approach,"" ° under which the IRS allocates
among co-conspirators profits from each of the conspiracy's acts rather than on
an aggregate basis.' Under either method of allocation, the IRS may
protectively redundantly allocate the total amount (of the pie or of profits from
each act)." 2
Professor Schoenfeld expresses concern about the IRS's protective allocation
of the same dollar amounts to multiple co-conspirators."' This is an important
issue because of the taxpayer's burden of proving the amount of the deficiency
that is not attributable to fraud.'" It may be difficult for the taxpayer to prove
that too much of the conspiracy's income was assigned to him rather than to co-
conspirators, particularly in the likely absence of books and records. Yet, as
Professor Schoenfeld notes, if the IRS does not take a protective position, it
increases its risk of whipsaw."'
Professor Schoenfeld also points out that some co-conspirators may not have
received notices of deficiency, perhaps because they were not convicted of
Since we have concluded that respondent has shown with respect to each petitioner an
underpayment of tax in the year 1969, a part of which was due to fraud, it is incumbent
on petitioners to show that the amounts of the deficiencies as determined by respondent
are in error. Because of the position taken by each petitioner, that he had received no
unreported income, it is very difficult to determine exactly how much of the money
extracted from DMI by the four petitioners was taken by each.
Id. (citation omitted).
179. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 544.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 543-44. The IRS does not always use redundant allocation. See, e.g., Barber
v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1026, 1029 (1980) (upholding IRS determination that one-seventh
of bank robbery proceeds would be allocated to taxpayer, one of seven participants), affd, 679 F.2d
896 (9th Cir. 1982).
183. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 544-47.
184. See I.R.C. § 6663(b) (1994).
185. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 543.
A whipsaw situation occurs in the tax field when two taxpayers take positions with
respect to a particular transaction which are so inconsistent with each other that only
one should logically succeed-and yet, because ofjurisdictional or procedural reasons,
first one and then the other prevails against the government.
Remarks by Phillip R. Miller at Court of Claims Judicial Conference, October 14, 1971, on
Whipsaw Problems in Tax Cases, 25 TAX LAWYER 193 (1972).
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underlying crimes" 6 (and thus fraud would be harder to prove). If one taxpayer
successfully argues that part of his "share" was actually received by others, the
IRS would be faced with either increasing the deficiency of the others
(procedurally disadvantageous), or being whipsawed if those others were either
not before the court or had already successfully argued that those amounts were
not received by them. Thus, he agrees that "the protective position makes
sense" 18 7 under a "slice of the pie" approach.' 8 He nonetheless questions the
"logic behind the protective position ... in act-by-act cases[,] [b]ecause there is
no 'pie."
1 89
Actually, the difference between slice-of-the-pie and act-by-act case is the
number of pies and size of those pies. That is, a particular case analyzed as a
slice-of-the-pie case would have one large pie for allocation, while that case
analyzed on an act-by-act basis would have multiple, smaller pies to allocate.
Mandina v. Commissioner,'9° quoted below, illustrates this principle. 
9
Redundant allocation of slices of the pie or pies involved protects the IRS,
but at the expense of taxpayer difficulties of proof. As Professor Schoenfeld
points out, the taxpayer may not know until after trial how much the IRS really
plans to attribute to him, hampering his defense.' 92 Yet all is not lost. "The
Commissioner has the right to make inconsistent determinations to protect the
public fisc, as long as none of the deficiencies has been collected and the
Commissioner acknowledges only one tax liability is due."'93 That is, the IRS
may collect only one tax on any given deficiency. 94 In fact, the IRS generally
will drop its protective position before entry of decision. For example,'" in Ryan
v. Commissioner, an act-by-act case' 96 that is an important focus of Professor
186. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 543.
187. Id. at 544.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 545.
190. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 359 (1982), affd, 758 F.2d 1399 (11 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), and
af'd as modified sub nom. Schaffer v. Comm'r, 779 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1985).
191. See infra text accompanying note 200.
192. See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 546-47.
193. Ryan v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1778, 1787 (1998) (emphasis added).
194. See, e.g., Schaffer, 779 F.2d at 852; Gerardo v. Comm'r, 552 F.2d 549, 556 (3d Cir.
1977).
195. Another example used by Professor Schoenfeld is Arouth v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1390 (1992). See Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 543 n.162. In that case, "[t]he court
permitted the protective position until further information was uncovered; when no records or
reliable testimony were uncovered regarding the conspirators' division of income, the court
determined that it was 'appropriate to approximate the respective percentages of the sales proceeds
that each petitioner received."' Id. (quoting Arouth, 64 T.C.M. at 1395). In other cases, the IRS
abandoned its protective position on brief, arguing instead for pro rata allocations. See, e.g., Puppe
v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1297, 1300 (1998).
196. Schoenfeld, supra note 5, at 544 n.167.
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Schoenfeld's article, 197 the court noted, "At trial, [IRS's] counsel stated [IRS's]
intention to ask the Court to decide the amounts of income each petitioner
received individually. Accordingly, on brief [the IRS] no longer attributes the
same dollar of income to more than one [taxpayer]....
In addition, from the perspective of a particular co-conspirator, consolidating
the cases of all parties to the conspiracy may be best because the Tax Court
generally will avoid redundant deficiency determinations.99 For example, in one
case, the Tax Court stated:
Because of the lack of evidence and our belief that it would be totally
unfair to tax the same amount to each of these petitioners merely
because of their failure to prove the division of the amount, we conclude
that one-third of the $300,000 obtained from the June 20, 1969, check is
taxable to each of petitioners Mandina, O'Nan and Schaffer, and none
of this amount is taxable to petitioner Mitchell. Because of this same
lack of evidence, we conclude that one-fourth of [the amounts from each
of five transactions] is taxable to each of the four petitioners.2"
Given this approach, consolidating the cases of all parties to the conspiracy may
be better for taxpayers in multi-party fraud cases.2"'
Finally, on an act-by-act approach to the conspiracy, if the IRS does not
connect a particular taxpayer with a tax-generating act, the court probably will
not assign any income to the taxpayer from that act. In Ryan, the court stated:
197. See, e.g., id. at 517 n.* ("The opinions of the author are largely based and are augmented
by... Ryan."); id. at 535-36 (describing facts surrounding testimony of revenue agent in Ryan);
id. at 545-46 (describing complication in Ryan that arose from IRS use of protective positions); id.
at 553-54 (using Ryan as an example of a case in which an element missing after application of
partial collateral estoppel may be proven by other means).
198. Ryan, 75 T.C.M. at 1787.
199. See, e.g., Ash v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 974, 976-77 (1974) ("Respondent admits
an inconsistent position and acts as a stakeholder. It would, therefore, seem inappropriate to tax
both Ash and Cannon on the entire $64,680. Accordingly we hold that Ash and Cannon each
earned one-half of the total sent from Hodges to Ash, or $32,340."), affd sub nom. Cannon v.
Comm'r, 533 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1976).
200. Mandinav. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 359,373(1982), affd, 758 F.2d 1399(1lth Cir.
1984) (per curiam), and affd as modified sub nom. Schaffer v. Comm'r, 779 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1985) (emphasis added).
.On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Schaffer should not have
been attributed any income from certain transactions. Schaffer, 779 F.2d at 860. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding with respect to Mandina. Thus,
in this case, appeals to different circuits resulted in a partial whipsaw for the IRS.
201. In a sense, once the aggregate deficiency is determined in a multi-party case, the case
reflects a sort of reverse interpleader situation, with the IRS as a stakeholder. That is, interpleader
serves to determine how to allocate a sum of money among multiple claimants, while in a multi-
party tax fraud case, the issue is how to allocate the obligation to pay a sum of money. Cf Ash, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) at 976 ("Respondent admits an inconsistent position and acts as a stakeholder.").
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As we review each of respondent's assertions concerning each
respective search, we consider whether respondent has presented
predicate evidence linking the specific petitioner to the tax-generating
activity from which respondent asserts income has arisen for such
petitioner. Where there is no such predicate evidence, we attribute no
income to that petitioner.2°2
CONCLUSION
Those accused of civil tax fraud, particularly following a related criminal
conviction, will likely face a tough fight with the IRS. Is that fair? It is
important to note that the IRS will encounter major obstacles, as well. The
taxpayer generally benefits from his superior information about his activities. In
addition, in attempting to reconstruct a taxpayer's transactions, the IRS will
inevitably face difficulties resulting from the likelihood that a guilty taxpayer
will have taken steps to conceal his activities.
Contrary to the impression given by Professor Schoenfeld's article, the
taxpayer will not be precluded from receiving information about the IRS's case.
Nonetheless, a taxpayer who denies any and all participation in the underlying
activity is unlikely to win a tax fraud case if there is proof of his involvement in
that activity. The taxpayer will not be able to rebut the amount of conspiracy
profits allocated to him if he simply denies any participation in the conspiracy.
A complete denial therefore may not be the best strategy, particularly in a case
involving a related criminal conviction or substantial evidence of the taxpayer's
participation in the conspiracy. Instead, the taxpayer may be able to present
evidence indicating that someone else actually received amounts attributed to
him.
A taxpayer facing the IRS in a civil fraud case also benefits from certain
procedural protections. First, it is the IRS that bears the burden of proving both
an underpayment of tax and the element of fraud. Second, its proof must rise to
the level of clear and convincing evidence. A criminal conviction of the taxpayer
will help the IRS meet that burden. That may seem unfair, but a criminal
conviction means that the taxpayer, most likely represented by counsel, was
found guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ourjustice system generally
allows both a civil suit following a criminal conviction and use of collateral
estoppel in the subsequent civil suit, if its elements are met.
In sum, Professor Schoenfeld's article is a valuable contribution to the
limited literature on federal tax controversies. His article reflects serious
concerns about the checks on the power of the IRS. This reply has indicated
areas in which existing checks are sufficient, as well as areas in which
improvements would make the tax controversy process more balanced and
procedurally fair.
202. Ryan, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1787-88.
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